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An increasing number of researchers are recognizing the importance of the role played by
employees in maintaining the effectiveness of an information security policy. Currently,
little research exists to validate the relationship between the actions (behaviors) taken by
employees in response to exceptional situations (antecedents) regarding an organization’s
information security policy, the impact (consequences) those actions have on an
organization, and the motives that prompt those actions. When these exceptional
situations occur, employees may feel compelled to engage in behaviors that violate the
terms of an information security policy because strict compliance with the policy could
cause the organization to lose revenue, reputability or some other business advantage. To
address this issue, this research study investigated how to design an effective information
security policy for exceptional situations in an organization. In order to achieve this goal,
this study explored how an information security policy should be designed with the
critical components of clarity, comprehensiveness, ease of use and flexibility, in addition
to including provisions for the work contingencies of employees. The aim of this
proposed study was to demonstrate how the application principles of the prima-facie,
utilitarian and universalizability design theories can aid in designing an information
security policy that includes these essential elements. The research study explored the
effectiveness of the policy's design and the effect it had on employee compliance with the
policy in exceptional situations. A survey questionnaire was administered to a control
group and an experimental group consisting of full-time and part-time employees who
worked in various departments of a single organization. The survey employed a fivepoint Likert-type scale. The data gathered from the questionnaire was analyzed.
Inferential statistics used the general linear model (GLM), including the t-test, analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA), regression analysis, and factor analysis with the latest SPSS
version computer statistical analysis program. This study built to develop a model for
designing an effective information security policy for exceptional situations in an
organization. Based on the analysis of fit the model for designing an effective
information security policy for exceptional situations in an organization was determine to
be a success model. This study should provide many opportunities for future research, as
well as providing information security practitioners and academics a solid roadmap for
designing effective information security policies within an organization to apply during
exceptional situations.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1 Background

As the electronic storage of information grows increasingly prevalent because of
advancements in technology, the need for organizations to develop and utilize
modernized methods and systems to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability
(CIA) of their information assets also continues to escalate. Electronically stored
information is susceptible to a host of new cyber threats from both insiders and outsiders
(Dunkerley & Tejay, 2009). However, information security specialists generally agree
that the establishment and implementation of an information security policy is one of the
most essential factors in safeguarding an organization’s information assets (Da Veiga, &
Eloff, 2010; Dzazali, Sulaiman, & Zolait, 2009; Eloff, J., & Eloff, M., 2005; Parker, 1997;
Straub, 1990; Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda, & Kiountouzis, 2005; Warman, 1992).
Increasingly, researchers (Siponen, & Vance, 2010; Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood, 2010;
Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda, & Kiountouzis, 2005; Knapp, Morris, Marshall, &
Anthony, 2009; Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010) recognize the importance of the
role played by employees in maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of information
systems (IS) security policies (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010; Karjalainen & Siponen,
2011), particularly in the case of exceptional situations (Siponen & Iivari, 2006).
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The issue of employee noncompliance with an information security policy is
strongly related to the sociability of human nature (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat,
2009; Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Renaud, 2012). As determined by Scott, Laurie,
Angermeier, Raymond, and Boss, (2009) as well as Bosworth and Kabay (2002), an
information security policy induces employees to contemplate their views about their
obligation to follow the terms of the policy in order to secure and safeguard the
information assets of an organization. Organizations that try to compel reluctant
employees to accept and obey an inflexible information security policy are likely to be
met with opposition. The reasons for this opposition are because a rigorous policy tends
to complicate an employee’s tasks and because it is human nature for an individual to
rebel when he or she feels coerced or pressured. Consequently, employees should be able
to easily understand and follow a clear, flexible and comprehensive information security
policy. Depending on the factors related to clarity, comprehensiveness and ease of use
that an organization takes into account during the policy’s development, employees may
regard the policy as either a meaningless show of authority or a manifestation of their
personal ideals and beliefs (Cavallari, 2011; D’Arcy, & Hovav, 2007; Smith, Winchester,
Bunker, & Jaimeson, 2010; Workman, & Gathegi, 2007).
Although some information security policies may prove reliable in maintaining
the integrity of sensitive data under a routine state of affairs in the work environment,
many organizations face the challenge of designing and enforcing an information security
policy that employees can follow during exceptional situations. An exceptional situation
is defined as an unforeseen business proposition or prospect that arises in organizations
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with a fluctuant and variable outlook and that may entail employees to violate an
information security policy in order to promote the welfare of the organization (Siponen
& Iivari, 2006).
Because of the rapidly evolving nature of today’s corporate world, it is growing
more and more common for organizations to operate in a continual state of flux as new
technological and social concerns and circumstances steadily arise (Tidd & Bessant, 2011;
Alaa, 2009; Patel, Eldabi, & Khan, 2010). According to Houry, (2012), these emergent
organizations are more likely to encounter exceptional situations than businesses whose
future outlook is generally stable (Alatalo, Oinas-Kukkonen, Kurkela & Siponen, 2002;
Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Kingsford, 2008; Truex, Baskerville & Klein, 2001).
When these exceptional situations occur, employees may feel compelled to engage in
behaviors that violate the terms of an information security policy because strict
compliance with the policy could cause the organization to lose revenue, reputability or
some other business advantage (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). However, despite an
employee’s favorable intentions, the outcome of his or her decisions may not always be
advantageous for the organization.
An organization can be defined as a business of any type and may range in size
from small to large. Although some organizations are more likely to encounter
unpredictable occurrences than others, the information assets of a sole proprietorship or a
conglomerate are both exposed to the same risks based on the actions of the employees in
regard to an information security policy when an exceptional situation does occur. For
this reason, an information security policy that accounts for the possibility of exceptional
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situations is important for all organizations (Hedström, Kolkowska, Karlsson, & Allen,
2011; Siponen, Willison, Baskerville, 2008; Willison, & Warkentin, 2013).
In essence, an information security policy is a product of how both people and
systems are organized and managed (Warkentin & Willison, 2009; Baskerville &
Siponen, 2002). As such, organizations need to carefully consider the design process of
the information security policy and to thoroughly evaluate the policy's clarity,
comprehensiveness, flexibility and ease of use to aid employees in following its terms
when they are presented with exceptional situations. Therefore, it is crucial for
organizations to understand the behaviors and motives of employees who intentionally
ignore or disregard the information security policy in exceptional situations, potentially
placing personal and organizational information at risk.
The design and provisions of an information security policy may vary depending
upon the nature of a particular organization or department. For instance according to
Doherty, Anastasakis and Fulford, (2009), governments, large corporations, small
businesses and universities are each likely to produce distinct information security
policies that are suitable for their particular business requirements. Similarly, unique
policies may be required by an organization’s various departments, such as human
resources, sales, communications, marketing, accounting, customer, and information
technology. In addition, the stipulations in an information security policy can range from
highly detailed to loosely structured. One rule may explicitly inform an employee of the
various steps to take or to avoid in order to prevent a breach of security while another
rule provides only a broad observation of the risks and penalties of noncompliance.
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These penalties or sanctions have the ability to influence the decisions that
employees make about complying with the terms of an information security policy. When
faced with an exceptional situation, some employees may choose to strictly comply with
an information security policy if they feel that their job security is at risk, even if they
believe that violating the information security policy is in the best interests of the
organization.

1.2 Research problem and argument

The research problem was to investigate how to design effective information
security policies for exceptional situations in an organization. Employees need guidance
to make a decision to follow or violate an information security policy when faced with
exceptional situations. An effective information security policy should be clear,
comprehensive, usable, and flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of data,
activities, and resources. It should also be designed to provide employees with guidance
on how to handle unexpected or uncommon situations or incidents that may occur in the
workplace. A poorly designed information security policy may provide inadequate
protection for sensitive data or cause employees to take actions that are detrimental to the
organization (Herath & Rao, 2009). As stated by Herath and Rao, various factors play a
role in determining an employee's willingness to observe or abuse the terms of an
information security policy, including intrinsic and extrinsic incentives and penalties, the
social acceptability of a given behavior, and personal beliefs. Employees are far less
likely to comply with an information security policy that is not clear, comprehensive,
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flexible, and easy to understand and use. Besnard and Arief (2004) asserted that the
interaction between employees and computers should play a more significant role in the
design of an information security policy. Additionally, Workman, Bommer, and Straub
(2008) argued that IS specialists still struggle with the issue of how to effectively apply
an information security policy. Based on the research results of Workman, Bommer, and
Straub, the primary reason for this struggle was because of the flaws in the
methodologies used in the majority of studies that have analyzed and examined the issue
of employee compliance. An information security policy should allow employees to
easily comprehend, follow and observe its terms in order to assist them in making the
appropriate decisions, regardless of their experience, intelligence or skill level.
An information security policy should be effective and sustainable in an
organization. As indicated by Siponen, Baskerville, & Heikka, 2006, an organization can
help to increase the soundness of its information security program through the design and
development of an information security policy that is clear, comprehensive, flexible and
usable. After implementing such a policy, an organization should regularly examine,
appraise and address any differences that subsequently occur in the security of its
information assets (Milicevic, & Goeken, 2010). Milicevic and Goeken stated that these
periodic assessments and revisions can help an organization to ascertain if stages of rapid
adjustments in its structure or proceedings impact the effectiveness of its information
security policy.
The research argument was that an effective information security policy should be
clear, comprehensive, flexible and usable and should take into account the work
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contingencies of the employees of an organization. An information security policy
requires a design process and application principles that focus on clarity,
comprehensiveness, flexibility and usability, particularly in regard to guidelines for
handling exceptional situations. This type of policy is more effective in maintaining the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of an organization's information assets (Siponen
& Iivari, 2006).
An information security policy should be flexible. The security of an
organization’s information assets is jeopardized to varying degrees whenever an
employee fails to comply with an information security policy. The reasons that
employees violate the terms of an information security policy are complex and varied
(Herath & Rao, 2009). According to Herath and Rao, a combination of social, economic
and psychological factors affect an employee's decision-making process when
contemplating whether to comply with or ignore the terms of an information security
policy. In addition, employees may unintentionally violate the policy because they are not
aware of its terms. However, of greater concern to practitioners are those instances in
which an employee knowingly violates an information security policy, even if it is not
done with malicious intent (Warkentin & Willison, 2009). An employee may feel that
complying with the policy is too time-consuming, pointless or complex. These security
breaches are especially liable to occur when an employee encounters an exceptional
situation that necessitates a swift response (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). A degree of
flexibility in a policy gives employees the opportunity to make choices based on response
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time, client satisfaction, data security and other factors that are in the best interests of the
organization.
An information security policy should take into account the work contingencies of
the employees of an organization. A classic professional in the field of information
systems security, Desman (2001) argued that the effectiveness of information security
relies more on human factors than on technological factors. Similarly, other longstanding industry authorities such as Gaunt (2000), as well as more contemporary experts
(Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010), agree that the issue of employee compliance is one of the
greatest risks to the safety of an organization’s information assets. Furthermore, the
failure of an information security policy to take into account the risks presented by
exceptional situations or the dynamics that influence an employee’s behavior under these
circumstances increases the probability of insider threats. Without any guidelines to
follow when exceptional situations arise, an employee is liable to take actions that
compromise the CIA of an organization’s data or cause the organization to miss out on
lucrative business prospects (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). As stated by Hadasch, Maedche
and Mueller (2011), an employee can compromise the CIA of an organization’s
information assets with even one careless misstep while carrying out his or her daily job
functions. However, an information security policy must also enable employees to
perform their prescribed duties in a methodical, efficient and timely manner in order to
remain cost efficient (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Pahnila, Siponen, &
Mahmood, 2007).
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An information security policy should be usable. If employees do not comply
with an information security policy, the safety of the organization’s information assets
may be compromised. Oftentimes, employees feel that certain procedures in an
information security policy hinder their ability to complete daily work tasks in a timely
manner (Siponen & Iivari, 2006; Siponen & Vance, 2010). This mindset or belief is due
in large part to the fact that an information security policy is too complex, rigid, unsound
or time-consuming to obey. The issue of employee noncompliance with an information
security policy is of fundamental importance to organizations and their information
security experts. According to Desman (2001), the behaviors and attitudes of people are
more closely intertwined with the field of information security than are technological or
procedural matters (Desman, 2001; Shin, 2010). Consequently, an organization’s
workforce poses the greatest threat to its information security (Gaunt, 1998; Warkentin,
& Willison, 2009).

1.3 Importance of research problem

Currently, little research exists to validate the relationship between the actions
(behaviors) taken by employees in response to exceptional situations (antecedents)
regarding an organization’s information security policy, the impact (consequences) those
actions have on an organization, and the motives that prompt those actions. As stated by
Siponen and Iivari (2006), current studies overlook these important relationships. One of
the most crucial links to examine in this chain was the connection between employees’
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actions and the justifications that caused the employees to behave in such a manner. Once
understood, the correlation between these factors may assist an organization in designing
and implementing an information security policy that is more conducive to effectively
resolving exceptional situations, resulting in more favorable consequences for the wellbeing of an organization’s information assets. As stated by Dunkerley and Tejay (2009),
if an organization is aware of its risk factors and takes appropriate measures to alleviate
them, it can expedite the handling of its business transactions and affairs.
Bostrom, Gupta and Thomas (2009) argue that it is ill-advised for any
organization to adopt an IS theory that disregards or underestimates the importance of the
human element in regard to the security of the organization’s information assets.
Employees are far less likely to comply with an information security policy that is
complicated and unyielding.
However, in order for an information security policy to gain general approval
from management and staff, an organization needs to consider the opinions, suggestions
and ideas of its employees during the policy’s design process (Gaunt, 2000). This enables
the organization to create an information security policy with content that is clear,
comprehensive and understandable. Employees can also provide valuable
recommendations on how to develop information security procedures that can prove
beneficial in handling exceptional situations. Numerous researchers support the belief
that employee participation is essential, claiming that human behavior is among the top
three concerns of an organization for enhancing the security of its information security
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policy (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000; Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; Hitchings, 1995) by
providing employees with a sense of ownership for their input.
Information security breaches caused directly by the failure of employees to
comply with an information security policy represent a growing concern for
organizations (Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005). As the demand for
confidentiality and discretion in business matters continues to increase along with the
pace of technological advancements, so too does the competitiveness among
organizations to develop reliable information security policies. Therefore, an organization
that gains a trustworthy reputation for consumer privacy also gains a distinct strategic
advantage over its competitors, thereby amplifying the significance of an effective
information security policy and making it a necessary foundation for the success of an
organization.
As noted by D'Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, (2009), between 50 to 75 percent of
information security problems in an organization are associated with the factor of human
involvement. However, this recognition gives researchers and practitioners no insight into
the dynamics that cause or motivate employees to breach an information security policy.
It is not clear whether the breaches are accidental, intentional or caused by information
security policies that are inflexible and unclear, failing to provide employees with
guidelines on how to handle exceptional situations. To address this lack of knowledge,
Dutta and Roy (2008); Gonzalez and Sawicka (2002); Mishra and Dhillon (2006, June);
Sawicka and Kopainsky, (2008, July); Stanton (2007); Van Niekerk and von Solms (2005)
advocate the need for empirically based research studies that investigate the relationship
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between the culture or milieu of an organization and its information system (IS),
including the employees.
An information security policy is the underpinning that protects an organization’s
privileged data and secures the confidentiality of its employees' and clients' information.
By inviting employees from various departments to participate in the design process of an
information security policy, organizations can increase the likelihood of creating a policy
that is easier for personnel to understand and follow and that helps to ensure employee
compliance. Additionally, if organizations incorporate the flexibility and application
principles of design theories into their information security policies, they can improve
their probability of achieving a positive outcome in exceptional situations (Siponen &
Iivari, 2006).
A widely held conviction is that the safety of an organization’s information assets
is dependent upon the implementation of an information security policy. However,
developing a successful information security policy is a difficult undertaking that requires
the consideration of many elements and dynamics (Karyda, Kiountouzis, & Kokolakis,
2005). Employees may occasionally violate an information security policy because they
regard it as an impediment that obstructs their workflow. In fact, many organizations fail
to achieve the objectives they have set with the execution of their information security
policy (Karyda et. al, 2005). It is essential for an organization’s information security
experts to appreciate the significance of human involvement in relation to the success or
failure of an information security policy and to consider design principles when
developing information security policies for exceptional situations. More specifically,
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these specialists need to comprehend how societal factors, such as the differences
between cultures and generations, can impact the viewpoints, feelings and opinions that
employees have toward complying with an organization’s information security policy
(Al-Awadi, 2010).
Despite the fact that organizations regard an information security policy as a
necessity, the implementation of an information security policy cannot guarantee that an
employee is going to obey it. Consequently, the purpose of this study was to address the
impact that the information-security design process had on the employees' voluntariness
(behavior) and the relationship between the policy's clarity, comprehensiveness,
flexibility, usability and its effectiveness in exceptional situations.

1.4 Definitions of Key Terms

The terms that were used in this study are defined as follows.
Information systems are defined as the deployment of information technology to collect,
process and disseminate information in organizations and society. Employees using
information technology are an important aspect of an information system. Information
systems include both technological components and the humans who use them to store,
process and distribute electronic data (Avison & Fitzgerald, 1995).
Information Security is defined as “a well-informed sense of assurance that information
risks and controls are in balance” (Anderson, 2003 p. 310). The goal of information
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security is to protect business assets and reduce costs by avoiding security violations and
reducing the negative effects they have on an organization.
Corporate business policy is defined as a set of diverse documents regarding an
organization's business objectives and intent to address business-related issues and to
provide guidelines to ensure that all decisions and activities are aligned with the defined
strategies as part of corporate governance (Wheelen & Hunger, 2008). Policies dictate
acceptable and unacceptable behaviors within an organization, including penalties for
violation of the policy's terms (Knapp, Marshall, Anthony, 2009).
Information security policy is a written, living document outlining the actions and
procedures that employees should follow in order to protect an organization’s
information security assets (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). According to Bulgurcu et al. (2010),
an information security policy outlines the function and tasks of employees in order to
protect an organization's information assets. Hone and Eloff (2002) suggest the
information security policy should be short and easy to read.
Exceptional situations are defined as atypical circumstances that may arise in an
emergent organization and cause employees to take actions that conflict with an
information security policy (Siponen & Iivari, 2006).
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Chapter 2

Review of the Literature
2.1 Introduction

One of the primary goals of an information security policy is to provide guidance
to employees in an organization by decreasing its risk, safeguarding its critical
information assets and lowering its expenditures for information security management
(Shoraka, 2011). In addition to complying with all internal and external regulations and
protocols, the policy should help to advance the structure and functionality of an
organization’s information system (Nigam & Siponen, 2011).
When stripped to its basic framework, an information security policy consists of
the rules and procedures that employees are requested to follow in order to protect the
private information of an organization and its clients. This framework is lent substance by
comprehensiveness, clarity, a degree of autonomy, and adaptability to various situations.
Ideally, the policy’s construction is completed by an awareness of how human behavior
can affect the manner in which that underlying structure is supported and vice versa. As
argued by Dunkerley and Tejay (2009), it is critical to apprehend the behaviors of the
people who utilize the information assets of an organization in order to create a
successful information security policy. Conversely, a poorly designed document provides
limited usability and voluntariness and may negatively affect the employees’ willingness
to comply with it. Consequently, the information security policy itself may pose an inside
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threat to an organization if it is not well-designed because employees are more apt to
misconstrue it or bypass its requirements, resulting in a state of noncompliance, which
may subject confidential information to a breach of security (Sipior & Ward, 2008).
As concluded by many recent studies, the human element was the cause of many
information security breaches (Herath & Rao, 2009; Lineberry, 2007; West, Mayhorn,
Hardee, & Mendel, 2009). Therefore, information security professionals must realize that
the success of an information security policy relies upon an understanding of the
multifaceted nature of human beings as much as it does upon technological expertise
(Soo Hoo, 2000). In addition, practitioners must identify how an employee’s motives and
level of freedom in making decisions about obeying or disregarding an information
security policy are influenced by the circumstances surrounding an exceptional situation
(Siponen & Iivari, 2006).
Although the use of an information security policy is widely advocated for
protecting confidential data, few experimental studies investigated how the structure,
phrasing and execution of a policy affect an organization (Verendel, 2009). Despite this
lack of empirical research, indications strongly suggest that a versatile, functional and
straightforward information security policy most effectively safeguards the confidential
data of an organization (Bahtiyar, & Ufuk, 2012; Sun, Han, & Liu, 2008). Any type of
breach or violation in an information security policy can be very costly and detrimental to
an organization. Therefore, it is vital for any organization to invest its time and resources
into designing an information security policy that diminishes this potential risk factor.
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2.2 Challenges faced by organizations

In a study conducted by Cisco (2008), over 50 percent of employees
acknowledged that they had knowingly violated the terms of their organization's
information security policy and an average of nearly half of the employees at the various
companies taking part in the study said that the reason they chose to violate the policy
was based on the assumption that the risks associated with their transgressions were
negligible. However, many organizations reported that employee abuse of information
security policies resulted in negative consequences that cost them a significant amount of
time and money to repair and led to the eradication or misappropriation of confidential
data (Cisco).
Although a considerable number of studies focused on the issue of employee
noncompliance, many organizations still face distinct challenges when developing an
information security policy. According to Long (2002), some of these challenges include
the level of satisfactory risk acceptance; variations in procedures among different
departments as a result of the unique threats faced by each; the legal constraints placed on
various business units according to their geographical location; personal viewpoints; and
the values, philosophies and politics of different cultures. When the risk-management
department of an organization implements an information security policy that covers all
of the organization’s branches and divisions (Soo Hoo, 2000; Spears, 2006; Wang,
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Chaudhury, & Rao, 2008), it can decrease the possibility of jeopardizing the
organization’s information assets by positively influencing the actions of employees
(Hadasch et al., 2011).
Baskerville and Siponen (2002) concluded that when an organization is
experiencing rapid internal changes in its structure, it may enforce stringent safety
measures that can restrict an employee’s ability to retrieve or view sensitive data,
essentially acting as an impediment that can pose a serious threat to the successful
continuation of an organization. This dilemma impedes an organization’s ability to grow
and pressures organizations to produce information security policies that are
contradictory and stringent. Oftentimes, the organizational changes made by a company
are due to profitable business ventures that were unanticipated, possibly causing an
organization to temporarily enforce procedures that are in opposition to the terms of its
information security policy.
One of the most consequential problems faced by organizations, however, is that
the view of reality held by the majority of people opposes some of the practices defined
by an information security policy (Bosworth & Kabay, 2002). An employee might allow
a colleague without the same level of credentials to view confidential documents simply
because the two of them are working together on an assignment or might share a
password based only on the fact that a co-worker is someone he or she trusts or likes.
However, most information security policies are still effective to some degree in
discouraging employee noncompliance (Straub & Nance, 1990), making them a
necessary component of an organization's information security management system.
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According to Siponen and Iivari (2006), organizations that deal with variable
conditions on a regular basis are in particular need of employing an information security
policy that is developed according to application principles. The use of application
principles are effective in helping an organization to develop an information security
policy that defines not only the actions and behaviors that employees are mandated or
forbidden to perform during times of stability but also those that are considered
reasonable and unreasonable in exceptional situations. In addition, they grant employees
a measure of autonomy to use their own judgment in making a decision.
An information security policy needs to provide employees with a precise
awareness of its objectives. It should also include well-defined explanations, examples
and descriptions, in addition to specific details of an employee’s expectations and
obligations (Gaunt, 1998). An information security policy that is designed appropriately
encourages and inspires an employee to contribute to an organization’s aim of
maintaining the security of its confidential information.

2.3 Information security policy approaches

Many researchers have published studies on different approaches to implementing
an information security policy, including checklists and industry standards (BSI, 2012;
GASSP, 1999), a virtual methodology (Hitchings, 1995) and a security-planning system
(Straub & Welke, 1998). However, these studies largely failed to offer organizations any
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pragmatic assistance on how to design the information security policy (Baskerville &
Siponen, 2002).
Hone and Eloff (2002) agreed that an information security policy plays a role of
central importance in any organization’s information security division. Because an
information security policy is oftentimes difficult to prepare and design, organizations
may obtain ready-made policies or templates from a variety of sources, such as textbooks
and the Internet. However, these policies are usually not industry-specific and may
require modification in order to meet the needs of a particular organization. Baskerville
and Siponen (2002) asserted that ready-made policies offer organizations little guidance
with preparing a policy, which is a matter of greater importance than simply providing
employees with a catalog of acceptable or unacceptable actions. Although some
organizations have consultants or IS specialists to make these revisions, Bjorck (2004)
stated that this does not necessarily solve the problem of properly implementing the
information security policy, which employees and management may ignore, even if they
are making an important business decision regarding information security. In addition,
Von Solms (1999) asserted that some organizations may not proffer the funds to
effectively employ an information security policy unless management believes that the
value is worth the cost.
Recent ISO/IEC directives (2011) defined a normative element of an information
security policy as one that states the boundaries of the policy or specifies its conditions.
More specifically, these ISO/EIC procedures postulate terms and acceptable equivalents
that an organization is required to use when denoting normative elements in an
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information security policy that are not mandatory in exceptional cases. The terms
indicated in Part 2 of the ISO/IEC Directives, which include “may,” “need not” and “can,”
are intended to give employees a degree of independence and direction when making
choices on the actions to take in exceptional situations.
However, the effectiveness of these procedures is criticized for a number of
reasons. Some of these reasons are that the procedures are too broad and hypothetical for
a particular organization or marketplace, require managers to dedicate ample time to
scrutinizing and enhancing their effectiveness, and do not place emphasis on increasing
customer satisfaction. In addition, it is argued that ISO 9001 focuses more on the
regulations and guidelines of an information security policy than on providing employees
with insight on how to interpret those procedures (Seddon, 2000). Both ISO 9000 and
9001 are criticized for presenting organizations with a registration process that is both
laborious and costly (Clifford, 2005). Consequently, the need to design an information
security policy that takes into account an employee’s motivations and provides guidance
for an employee on how to construe the terms of the policy, particularly in exceptional
situations, remains a relevant issue for organizations.
Many current researchers also advocate executing information security policies
that prohibit improper use of IS data, equipment and processes in order to decrease the
risks presented by employees (Hadasch et al., 2011). These studies helped to clarify some
of the factors that can influence employee compliance with an information security
policy, including an understanding of the risks of noncompliance with protective
technologies (Dinev & Hu, 2007; Herath & Rao, 2009; Liang & Xue, 2010), the real or
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perceived intrinsic and extrinsic benefits and motivations of compliance versus
noncompliance, such as self-efficacy, ease of use, organizational support, deterrents and
social stimuli (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Liang & Xue; Pahnila et al., 2007; Siponen &
Vance, 2010) and the reluctance to make inappropriate use of an organization’s
information security assets (D’Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2008; Johnston & Warkentin,
2010). However, these studies largely failed to provide information security specialists
with specific advice on how to design an information security policy, especially one that
was effective in helping employees to resolve exceptional situations (Siponen & Iivari,
2006).

2.4 Information Security Standards, Policies, and Guidelines
According to Vroom and von Solms (2004), not all employees’ violations of
information security policies are carried out with intentional or malicious intents. The
violations can be the result of negligence, a lack of understanding, clarity or
comprehensiveness, or ignorance of the security policies of the organization. Some
standards exist to address such violations and to specify how they can be avoided in
organizations.
In order to help universalize technology-based regulations, some organizations
regularly publish updated standards and guidelines in order to help universalize the
methods of maintaining and promoting information security management systems
(ISMS), in addition to other technologies. The SANS Institute (Smith, 2004) and the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) ISO/IEC 27000 recommended the
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application of an information security policy that is adaptable and allows for exceptions
to the rules based on unique circumstances.
Although interest in IS security has increased in recent years, very few empirical
studies examined how designing information security policies for exceptional situations
can benefit organizations. ISO 27000 suggests that an organization needs to continually
update and revise its information security policy to ensure that it remains clear,
comprehensive, easy to use and appropriate to the organization’s specific business
objectives and strategic goals. Again, this information failed to provide organization with
assistance on how to develop and implement an information security policy that
incorporates these elements and is easily understood by employees, especially regarding
exceptional situations.
Existing literature agrees that employees who have malicious intent or who do not
comply with an information security policy under normal conditions are the main threat
to an organization’s information assets. However, there are also many instances in which
an employee violates an information security policy in the belief that his or her decision
to do so is more advantageous to the organization than complying with the policy
(Siponen & Iivari, 2006; Siponen & Vance, 2010). In today’s swiftly advancing
technological environment, it is not uncommon for clients to request last-minute changes
or modifications to a product or service they are obtaining from an organization. With
little time to prepare for these adjustments, employees may need to temporarily violate
information security policies in order to accommodate a client’s needs. Therefore, it is
critical for organizations to analyze the reasons and justifications that motivate
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employees to obey or ignore information security policies in exceptional situations and
the effect of the employees’ actions on all parties involved in the business transaction.

2.5 Developing and implementing an information security policy

An information security policy safeguards the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of an organization’s paper and electronic documents and the privacy of
clients, personnel and the company in its entirety from various threats and hazards (Da
Veiga, Martins, & Eloff, 2007). Consequently, information security policies are usually
designed as "living documents." A living document is one that is revised and expanded
over time. This type of document is particularly suited for an information security policy
because of the rapid technological, procedural and business changes that are made in
today’s world (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2004).
Initially, surveys based on ad hoc theories or empirical analyses were the primary
methods of gathering data from an organization’s workforce by IS researchers evaluating
the issue of employee compliance with an information security policy (Hu, Xu, Dinev, &
Ling, 2011). As of late, however, IS researchers are recognizing the growing importance
of examining this concern through the lens of more established theories (D’Arcy et al.,
2008; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Siponen, 2000).
As previously stated, an organization may face the challenging issue of human
involvement when developing and implementing an information security policy. The
success of many of the procedures in an information security policy often relies upon the
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compliance of an organization’s employees. Analyzing and evaluating the effectiveness
of such procedures is possible only if the actions taken by humans are assessable and
subject to persuasion and if the organization encourages compliance by rewarding
positive behaviors and penalizing negative behaviors (Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood,
2010).
According to Liang and Xue (2010), it is critical to understand the impact that an
individual working in a socio-technical environment can have on the security of an
information system. The socio-technical theory recognizes two distinct yet interrelated
subsystems that operate in most organizations: a technical subsystem made up of
equipment, techniques and processes and a social system made up of employees and their
skills, expertise, viewpoints and principles (Bostrom et al., 2009). Recent IS security
studies are placing increased focus on how individual employees can negatively or
positively impact the security of an organization’s information assets in a socio-technical
work setting (Liang & Xue).
The design theories proposed by Siponen and Iivari (2006) offer an effective
solution to this problem because their application principles are intended to account for
the factor of human involvement. In addition, Siponen and Iivari offered pragmatic
advice to researchers and scholars on how to gather empirical evidence to design a policy
that can aid employees with taking the appropriate actions in exceptional situations,
including those cases that present a conflict between achieving an organization’s business
objectives and strictly complying with the information security policy. When integrated
into an information security policy, these design theories promote employee compliance
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by informing employees of the circumstances, justifications and causes that are
acceptable or unacceptable in regard to violating the policy’s terms without fear of
punishment or reprisal.
Depending on an employee’s intrinsic motivations, achieving the goal of the
application principle itself may prove rewarding. According to Beswick (2002), some
individuals feel a sense of gratification or fulfillment if their actions or accomplishments
endorse their sense of self-worth or support their ethical or moral beliefs. An employee
may feel satisfaction if his or her violation of an information security policy based on the
utilitarian design theory brings happiness to the greatest amount of people in an
exceptional situation. In addition, information security policies that utilize the prima-facie,
utilitarian and universalizability design theories can be tested empirically to evaluate their
effectiveness (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). Therefore, these design theories are a practical
alternative for organizations seeking to devise an effective information security policy.
According to Siponen and Iivari (2006), the two fundamental features that should
be incorporated into an information security policy during its design process are
adaptability and ease of use, in regard to both terminology and application. These
elements help to increase the likelihood of employee compliance.
Although Siponen and Iivari (2006) do not address the process of meta-design,
their theoretical models for the prima-facie, utilitarian and universalizability design
theories contain all the standard elements of a meta-policy. According to Baskerville and
Siponen (2002), a meta-policy focuses on the development of an information security
policy as well as its flexibility, application and validity. In addition, it is created to
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expedite revisions to procedures in an information security policy that contradict the
business objectives of an organization as it continues to grow and evolve (Baskerville &
Siponen). Baskerville and Siponen argue that information security policies based on
traditional checklists and universal standards, such as those issued by the ISO, are less
effective than meta-policies because they are too generalized to apply to the distinctive
culture of individual organizations.
Information security policies that contain standard normative procedures cannot
adequately stipulate actions or processes to resolve every conceivable circumstance that
may arise in an exceptional situation (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). However, Siponen and
Iivari argued that employees can effectively resolve a broad spectrum of exceptional
situations if an information security policy is designed with the following three elements:
a kernel theory basis; application principles from that kernel theory specifying how
employees should manage exceptional situations; and hypotheses that can be tested. As
defined by Siponen and Iivari, testable hypotheses denote an organization’s intention to
develop a research agenda to assist in advancing the continued analysis of information
security policies.
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Chapter 3

Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The research methodology was based on the framework proposed by Hevner,
March, Park and Ram (2004), which emphasized the design-science aspect of IS research
while recognizing that this approach is inextricably linked to the behavioral-science
paradigm. The researcher followed the design science approach (Hevner et al.) to answer
the following research question: "Does adopting the prima-facie, utilitarian, and
universalizability normative theories help organizations to design an effective
information security policy in exceptional situations?”. The goal of design science is to
offer innovative and applicable organizational solutions in the form of design artifacts to
help resolve a problem domain's challenges and obstacles (Hevner et al.). As stated by
Hevner et al, design science in the realm of information technology (IT) is ultimately
intended to solve issues related to the development, application and execution of
information systems by creating a unique and effective artifact that provides an
organization with practical benefits.
An artifact is described as an instantiation, model, construct or method that is
used to produce or employ one or more components of an information system other than
those involving the constituents that make up a particular organization, including its
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culture, employees, structure and commercial practices (Hevner et al., 2004). Although
the paradigm of design science is an indispensable factor in the formation of an IT
artifact, these distinctive characteristics of an organization still play an integral role in the
crafting and executing of an operative information system (Hevner et al., 2004).
The artifact of this study was an information security policy. A method to design
and implement an information security policy that it is effective in resolving exceptional
situations in an organization was developed and evaluated to achieve this goal. According
to Hevner et al. (2004), the success of a design science research project involving an IT
artifact relies upon a thorough evaluation of the artifact's value, effectiveness,
comprehensiveness and dependability in the context of the specific organization that it is
designed to benefit. Hence, the utility and efficacy of IS design theories are established
by evaluating their outputs: design artifacts.
Researchers must assess a design artifact to establish its usefulness, effectiveness
and merit. The goal of the design artifact evaluation is to show that the proposed artifact
provides value to the problem domain. If the artifact evaluation reveals that a design
artifact meets the problem domain's requisites and restrictions, the researcher is able to
confirm that the design theory is complete and effective. This study used an experimental
method to evaluate the efficacy of an information security policy based on the primafacie, utilitarian and universalizability design theories in resolving exceptional situations
in an organization.
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3.2 Theoretical Basis

The theoretical basis for the study followed Siponen and Iivari’s (2006) primafacie, utilitarian and universalizability design theories to achieve the goal of designing
and implementing an information security policy that helps employees to effectively
resolve exceptional situations in an organization. These are normative theories that
account for the factor of human involvement by providing employees with guidance on
the appropriate actions to take in exceptional situations, particularly those cases that
present a conflict between achieving an organization’s business objectives and strictly
complying with the information security policy (Siponen & Iivari, 2006).
The prima-facie theory, developed by Ross (2003), purports that a person's
actions are acceptable if the good that results from taking those actions is greater than the
good that results from not taking them. From an IS security perspective, this means that if
an employee violates the terms of an information security policy in an exceptional
situation, those actions are acceptable as long as they prove more beneficial to an
organization than if the employee had adhered to the terms of the policy.
The utilitarianism and other normative theories form the most suitable basis for
the development and application of information security policies that account for the
possibility of exceptional situations and the actions that people should take when
adhering to the standard would have deleterious effects (Siponen & Iivari, 2006).
Conceived by Kant (2002) in 1785, the moral philosophy of universalizability
states that an action or behavior is morally just if the maxim on which it is based could be
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universally accepted. Although based on this premise, Siponen and Iivari’s (2006)
universalizability design theory recognized varying degrees of universality. Their theory
consists of two sub-theses—impartial and security partial—that act as the application
principles for an information security policy (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). The impartial
universalizability thesis stipulates that an employee is permitted to take an action if any
other worker in the organization is granted that privilege under comparable circumstances,
and the security partial universalizability thesis requires an employee to contemplate if
the organization’s president or information security manager would permit any
responsible employee to take the action in question (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). Based on
these theories, this study intended to confirm that an information security policy can
effectively resolve information security conflicts that arise in exceptional situations if the
policy affords employees the possibility of taking actions that violate its terms on the
condition that these actions are more universally acceptable than taking actions that
comply with its terms.
As argued by Siponen and Iivari (2006), philosophical normative theories can
provide organizations with some understanding of the conditions and motives that cause
employees to violate normative information security policies in exceptional
circumstances and aid practitioners in the design and implementation of an information
security policy that helps employees to effectively resolve contingencies in the workplace.
According to Warman (1992), normative standards of an information security policy
specify how employees should or should not handle certain situations involving the CIA
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of an organization’s information assets. In contrast, non-normative standards are
informational or explanatory in nature (Krupansky, 2005).
However, Siponen and Iivari (2006) pointed out that empirical research needs to
be conducted in order to determine (a) if employees choose to violate or to observe an
information security policy in exceptional situations; (b) how employees justify their
decisions based on the application principles of the design theories; (c) the degree of
influence those motivating factors have on the actions taken by employees. The results of
these findings will contribute to the body of extant knowledge that endeavors to remedy
the challenge of human involvement in the crafting and administering of an information
security policy, particularly in organizations where exceptional situations regularly
generate conflicts with an organization’s business goals and objectives.

3.3 Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were adapted from Siponen and Iivari’s (2006) testable
design product hypotheses for designing application principles to cover exceptional
situations in an organization’s information security policy based on the prima-facie,
utilitarian or universalizability design theory. The hypotheses for this study focused
primarily on turbulent organizations with a rapidly changing business environment
(Siponen & Iivari, 2006). According to Siponen and Iivari (2006), these organizations
were much more likely to encounter exceptional situations that may require an employee
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to violate the terms of an information security policy in order to support the
organization’s best interests.
Moore and Benbasat (1991) argued that an individual’s perceived qualities of an
information technology (IT) innovation (method, process, procedure, etc.) are a more
reliable indicator of his or her subsequent behaviors than the actual characteristics of that
innovation. Therefore, voluntariness refers to an employee’s perception of his or her
freedom of choice in complying with or violating an information security policy's terms.
The voluntarism is a common construct in all three normative theories and included in all
hypotheses to show the impact of voluntariness on the acceptance of policy.
Effectiveness indicates the success of an information security policy in persuading an
employee to take the actions that provide the greatest intrinsic and extrinsic benefits to an
organization, its employees and clients, and the individual performing the actions.
Net benefits denote the business advantages gained by an organization, not
including any egocentric gains to the individual performing the actions. Net benefits are
the application principle in the prima-facie design theory by Siponen and Iivari (2006),
which was based on the prima-facie ethical theory of Ross (2003). Based on the premises
of this theory, it is expected that the research experiment validated that an information
security policy can effectively resolve information security conflicts that arise in
exceptional situations if the policy grants employees the liberty of compromising its
guidelines when the benefits of doing so are greater than the benefits of compliance.
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The prima-facie design theory allows for violations of the terms of an information
security policy in exceptional situations if the benefits expected to be gained by
noncompliance outweigh those expected to be gained by compliance.
•

H1: If the employees’ voluntarism and the expected benefits of
noncompliance increase, then an organization will experience fewer
consequences in response to employee noncompliance in exceptional
situations.

The philosophy of utilitarianism developed by Bentham (1907) is based on the
moral foundation of behaving in a manner that provides the most utility, or happiness,
and the least amount of pain to the greatest number of individuals. Siponen and Iivari
(2006) adapted this philosophical theory to their utilitarian design theory, which promotes
taking the actions that spread happiness to the greatest number of individuals involved in
a business transaction. This approach provides employees with some latitude in taking
actions that violate an information security policy if the anticipated effects of the actions
are more advantageous to the organization than the anticipated effects of the actions
produced by complying with the policy (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). Consequently, it is
expected that the quasi-experimental study revealed that an information security policy
can effectively resolve information security conflicts that arise in exceptional situations if
the policy gives employees the option of contradicting its terms in order to adhere to
security objectives that profit the greatest number of individuals involved in a business
transaction.
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•

H2: If the employees' voluntarism and happiness of noncompliance
increase, then an organization will experience fewer consequences in
response to employee noncompliance in exceptional situations.

The utilitarian design theory states that employees should obey the terms of an
information security policy under standard conditions but that the terms may be violated
if the number of people who profit from overall adherence to security objectives by this
action is greater than the number of people who do not profit.

The universalizability design theory states that employees should obey an
information security policy in ordinary situations. In exceptional situations, however,
they may follow one of the theory's two sub-theses.
•

H3: If the employees' voluntarism and universalizability of noncompliance
increase, then an organization will experience fewer consequences in
response to employee noncompliance in exceptional situations.
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Figure 1. Research model.

Adapted from Siponen and Iivari’s (2006) "Six Design Theories for IS Security,"
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics that account for an information security policy that is
successful in exceptional situations. According to Siponen and Iivari (2006), the
"success" of a policy is defined in terms of the positive information-security
consequences (dependent variable) that result from an employee's actions in exceptional
situations based on the independent variables. The minus sign following a hypothesis
indicates if this theorized association is expected to minimize the dependent variable.
The plus signs following the independent variables in Figure 1 indicate if those variables
have an interactive relationship with the dependent variable. For example, H1 illustrates
that as the voluntariness and expected benefits of an action increase, there is a
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corresponding rise in the probability that an organization will experience positive
consequences in response to employee actions in exceptional situations.
The dependent variable in this study was the consequences of an employee's
actions on the information security of an organization, and the independent variables
were the unique application principles of the prima-facie, utilitarian and universalizability
design methods, along with the degree of voluntariness an information security policy
allowed an employee. The application principle (or kernel theory) for the prima-facie
design theory aims to achieve the greatest net benefits for an organization. Likewise, the
intentions of the application principles for the utilitarian and universalizability design
theories strive to achieve the greatest degree of adherence to security objectives and
universalizability, respectively. Although Siponen and Iivari (2006) investigated the
potential effects of other design theories on the success or failure of an information
security policy, this study focused on the three design theories mentioned above because
of their flexibility and their recognition of and allowance for the fact that disobeying the
terms of an information security policy sometimes resulted in a more positive outcome
for an organization than the consequences of complying with the terms of a policy.

3.4 Research Design
This research study followed the design science research approach in IS. The
purpose of design science is to contribute to the knowledge base for the design and
construction of artifacts and to enhance the understanding of how to solve the social and
organizational problem for which the artifact is designed. According to Walls, Widmeyer
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and Sawy (1992), while the natural sciences are geared to find answers to questions about
the way things actually are, design sciences seek to answer questions about how things
should be. When design sciences are applied to the field of IS, the development of
artifacts is used to reach established goals (Simon, 1996).
Design science research is defined by Hevner et al. (2004) as follows:
"Design science research is a research paradigm in which a designer
answers questions relevant to human problems via the creation of innovative
artifacts, thereby contributing new knowledge to the body of scientific evidence.
The designed artifacts are both useful and fundamental in understanding that
problem. The fundamental principle of design science research is that knowledge
and understanding of a design problem and its solution are acquired in the
building and application of an artifact."
Design science is research that is intended to add to the body of knowledge in the
academic field and to provide guidance to practitioners through the creation of
information system artifacts using precise and meticulous methods (Hevner et al., 2004).
When used as a tool to develop a product, design science can be thought of as “a plan of
something to be done or produced” (March & Smith, 1995). In this regard, design science
is a research method that relies on the establishment of unique artifacts to solve problems
(Hevner et al.; Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2008), contribute to human knowledge and
awareness, and endow organizations with an increased ability to manage resources,
including their employee base. Through the development and utilization of the artifact
with the appropriate tools and techniques, the design-science research output solution is
achieved (March & Smith). One of the primary goals of a design-science artifact is to
augment and expand the knowledge base related to the resolution of complicated and
challenging business problems (Hevner et al., 2004).
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As observed by Hevner et al. (2004), the design artifact and IS design theory are
alike in many ways. Meta-design is a framework that satisfies meta-requirements through
the application of specific elements defined by a particular group of artifacts and
guidelines (Markus, Majchrzak, & Gasser, 2002). The conceptual foundations of metadesigns and meta-requirements are cultivated from the alteration, expansion or
application of kernel theories (Hevner et al., 2004). According to Markus et al., the
method used to design an artifact is, in essence, the set of standards that ultimately leads
to the formation of the artifact.
Design science research leads to a normative IS philosophy that benefits both
scholars and practitioners (Markus et al., 2002). Hevner et al. (2004) asserted that rigor
and relevance are essential elements of the results of any IS research, which is intended to
supplement the body of existing knowledge and to prove effective when put into practice
in the workplace. A key purpose of design science research, as a problem-solving concept
(Hevner et al., 2004; March & Smith, 1995; Simon, 1996; Walls et al., 1992), is to assist
organizations in achieving their business objectives. In order to achieve this goal, those
who conduct design science research must acquire a thorough understanding of the theory
and be able to formulate a precise description of the business problem they are striving to
resolve.
According to Hevner et al. (2004), the assessment process that is chosen relies
upon the consideration of the accessibility of needed materials and the careful evaluation
of the characteristics of the problem and the artifact design. Hevner et al. (2004) also
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suggested that it is advantageous to make use of existing assessment methods to assist in
calculating the efficacy and rigorousness of potential IT artifacts.
Hevner et al. (2004) proposed that IS research falls into one of two categories: the
behavioral paradigm or the design science paradigm. The former seeks to determine the
truth and the latter seeks to create a utilizable artifact (Hevner et al., 2004). Hevner et al.
(2004) also stated that the development of effective IS design theories and artifacts is
improved by taking into account the needs of the business world and combining them
with data drawn from the existing academic base to successfully satisfy the dual
requirements of rigor and relevance that are essential to achieving the goal of
constructing an effective design theory and IS artifact.
The results of this type of research are both relevant and rigorous because they are
designed to solve a distinctive business problem and are generally reached by attempting
to prove a design theory that can contribute to the academic knowledge base (Hevner et
al., 2004). The seven guidelines suggested by Hevner et al. (2004) for research involving
design science are summarized in Table 1 below and described in more detail in the
following paragraphs.
The first design-science guideline proposed by Hevner et al. (2004) is that it is
essential for an artifact to be devised as a model, construct, method or instantiation.
According to Hevner et al. (2004), the foundation of IS research is the IS artifact, which
incorporates into its design the features that are the essence of all phases of IS
development, from examination to fabrication to implementation. The central focus of IS
research is the problem relevance, which refers to the interest and significance the
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problem has to the business world. By rigorously evaluating a design, researchers can
improve and advance the process of developing an artifact by identifying and correcting
any flaws or weaknesses.
This research study applied the seven design-science research guidelines
introduced by Hevner et al. (2004) to all aspects of the design-science research process in
order to foster results that meet the objectives of rigor and relevancy. The seven designscience research guidelines, as defined by Hevner et al. (2004), are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Design-science research guidelines (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 83)
Guideline
1. Design as an Artifact

2. Problem Relevance

3. Design Evaluation

4. Research Contributions

5. Research Rigor

6. Design as a Search

7. Communication of Research

Description
Design-science research must produce a
viable artifact in the form of a construct, a
model, a method, or an instantiation.
The objective of design-science research is
to develop technology-based solutions to
important and relevant business problems.
The utility, quality, and efficacy of a
design artifact must be rigorously
demonstrated via well-executed evaluation
methods.
Effective design-science research must
provide clear and verifiable contributions
in the areas of the design artifact, design
foundations, and/or design methodologies.
Design-science research relies upon the
application of rigorous methods in both
the construction and evaluation of the
design artifact.
The search for an effective artifact
requires utilizing available Process means
to reach desired ends while satisfying laws
in the problem environment.
Design-science research must be presented
effectively both to technology-oriented as
well as management-oriented audiences.
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The guidelines applied to this research study are discussed in the order they are
presented in Table 1.
Guideline 1: Design as an Artifact. Design-science research must produce a viable
artifact in the form of a construct, a model, a method, or an instantiation (Hevner et al.,
2004, p. 83).
The design artifact of this research study is to develop an information security
policy effective in exceptional situations.
Guideline 2: Problem Relevance. The objective of design-science research is to
develop technology-based solutions to important and relevant business problems (Hevner
et al., 2004, p. 83).
Siponen and Iivari (2006) stated that there is a lack of information about how to
design information security policies intended to handle exceptional situations in an
organization. One purpose of this research study was to address this deficiency of
knowledge.
Guideline 3: Design Evaluation. The utility, quality, and efficacy of a design
artifact must be rigorously demonstrated via well-executed evaluation methods (Hevner
et al., 2004, p. 83).
The evaluation of the design artifact was demonstrated and illustrations for
applying the assessment methods in practice were presented in this research study.
Guideline 4: Research Contributions. Effective design-science research must
provide clear and verifiable contributions in the areas of the design artifact, design
foundations, and/or design methodologies (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 83).
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The contributions of this research study were the final results of the design of
information security policies for the Information Systems domain.
Guideline 5: Research Rigor. Design-science research relies upon the application
of rigorous methods in both the construction and evaluation of the design artifact (Hevner
et al., 2004, p. 83).
This study used design theories to develop and test different information security
policies and to evaluate the policies through experiments.
Guideline 6: Design as a Search. The search for an effective artifact requires
utilizing available means to reach desired ends while satisfying laws in the problem
environment (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 83).
The design-science research was based on literature reviews of information
security policy implementation and design in the IS domain.
Guideline 7: Communication of Research. Design-science research must be
presented effectively to technology-oriented and management-oriented audiences
(Hevner et al., 2004, p. 83).
This research study was intended for technology-oriented practitioners and
academicians who are researching issues related to designing an effective information
security policy. It also provided additional knowledge to managerial-oriented personnel
seeking to evaluate, implement and design an effective information security policy in the
information security field.
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In summary, the Hevner et al. (2004) guidelines provided the following
characteristics:
1.

Rigorous development of an artifact that meets business needs

2.

Implementation of quality standards

3.

Contributions toward the body of knowledge

4.

Suitable evaluation; ability to form the core of design science research

In addition, the research process of this research study used the general design
research cycle explained by Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2008) and illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2. The general methodology of design research Kuechler and Vaishnavi
(2008).

The design science research methodology proposed by Kuechler and Vaishnavi
(2008) comprises five phases: (a) awareness of a problem, (b) suggestions, (c)
development, (d) evaluation, and (e) conclusion. The following section explains how
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these phases correlate with the design science framework and how the phases were used
in this research study. The research study started with Phase 1 and Phase 2, which
formulated a problem based on literature review. Phase 3 developed the artifact and the
design concept model, and Phase 4 was the performance of a quasi-experiment for
evaluation. Finally, Phase 5 consisted of completion of the data analysis results.

3.5 Phases 1 and 2 – Awareness of Problem and Suggestion

Siponen and Iivari (2006) indicated that there is a need to develop information
security policies designed to deal with exceptional situations in organizations. Following
the second guideline as stated by Hevner et al. (2004), Phases 1 and 2 of this study
formulated a problem taken from literature review and examined and showed the
importance and relevance of designing an information security policy in the IS domain,
based on the prima-facie, utilitarian, and universalizability design theories. The design
process of an information security policy in these phases was based on these three
theories and was discussed and reviewed with a team of five information security
practitioners in the organization. A lack of design information for security policies in the
field of IS domain was addressed in this research study (D’Aubeterre, Iyer, & Singh,
2009; Kolkowska & Dhillon, 2012). The literature is lacking in empirical studies that
closely examine how to design clear, flexible and comprehensive information security
policies so employees can make positive decisions when faced with exceptional
situations (Whitman, 2008). Designing an effective information security policy for

52

exceptional situations in an organization is valuable for at least three potential reasons.
An information security policy needs to provide clarity and communicate potential risk to
employees of an organization in exceptional situations, in addition to ensuring that risk
mitigation methods are in place. The policy also needs to increase flexibility for
employees when making decisions about "mandatory" rules and reporting identified
violations in exceptional situations. Lastly, the design effectiveness of an information
security policy can be increased if the policy is comprehensive and it is integrated with
other business policies in the organization, making it a part of the organization's culture
(Puhakaiken & Siponen, 2010). The end product of these phases was a proposal for new
research and the results are an effective design of an information security policy in
exceptional situations.

3.6 Phase 3 – Artifact Development

This research study focused on the prima-facie, utilitarian, and universalizability
design theories in order to develop an information security policy artifact. During this
phase, the artifact was developed based on literature review and the three aforementioned
normative theories utilizing design application principles. The literature review,
organizational strategies and processes, business needs, and the roles and behaviors of
people were used to create an information security policy. An information security policy
prototype was developed and implemented. Prototyping development was borrowed from
the software engineering discipline, as shown in Figure 3.
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Requirements

Develop
prototype
First prototype

Improved
prototype

Implement
and use
Feedback

Revise and
enhance

Figure 3: Prototyping (based on Sommerville 2007, p. 411)

After the development of the information security policy prototype, the overall
concept was evaluated (Sommerville, 2007). The evaluation process was intended to
determine if the design artifact meets the conditions of the problem domain, ensuring that
it is functional and efficient. Design artifacts should be assessed according to five specific
criteria: observational, analytical, experimental, testing, and descriptive (D’Aubeterre et
al., 2009). An experiment based on empirical evidence is of assistance in validating the
characteristics of the intended design artifact (Hevner et al., 2004) and producing broadspectrum results (Creswell, 2008). Experimental evaluations examine the nature and
performance of design artifacts through the application of simulation and controlled
experiments. Baskerville, Pries-Heje, and Venable (2007) proposed that an evaluation
process conducted using experiments or other "hard methods" can help to reduce errors
and ensure the procedure is all-inclusive.
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Combining the paradigms of behavioral science and design science, Hevner et al.
(2004) established an information systems research framework. Hevner et al. (2004)
asserted that the integration of these two sciences enhances information systems research.
As described in Figure 3, the information systems research framework defines
information systems research through the construction and assessment of theories and
artifacts. This study used a quantitative research method to prove hypotheses by
exploring how different variables influence and impact each other. The information
security policy design process can impact employee behavior regarding information
security policies in exceptional situations. The variables used in this research focused on
the information security policy design developed for an organization. These variables
explored an employee's voluntariness to comply with the terms of an existing information
security policy during exceptional situations. The dependent variable was informationsecurity consequences. The independent variables were as follows: (a) security expected
benefits; (b) happiness brought about by security actions; (c) universalizability by
security actions; and (e) voluntariness (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). The output of this phase
was an information security policy artifact. Practitioners should assess a design artifact's
value and efficiency to determine its benefits to an organization. According to Hevner et
al. (2004), the knowledge base contains reliable approaches for the rigorous assessment
of a design artifact. As suggested by Hevner et al. (2004), the primary factors guiding the
evaluation process should be the basic characteristics of the problem and the artifact and
resources accessible to the researcher.
.
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Environment Relevance
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Appropriate
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Additions to the
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Figure 4. Design science research framework (Adapted from Hevner et al. 2004 p.
80).

The environment and the applicable knowledge base regulate research activity.
The environment can be defined as the problem space where the relevant research criteria
are found. The knowledge base can be defined as a combination of research methods and
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information systems research foundations. At the hub of this framework is information
systems research, where applicable research methods are selected from a knowledge base
in an associated field and utilized according to an organization's requirements.
The IT artifact is at the center of design science research and is based on both
theory and practice to ensure an efficient system. It is possible for artifacts to generate
innovative theories, so the future should be considered during the design process. Design
scientists need to contemplate the research questions that will have to be answered when
the artifact is being evaluated. This normative approach is frequently motivated by a
conventional outlook of design and the idea of "wicked" problems; for example, the
production of a functional artifact can be considered a contribution to science in itself if
the design space in which it was developed posed considerable enough difficulties for the
design scientist (Hevner et al., 2004).
Artifacts are “intended to solve identified organizational problems. Such artifacts
are represented in a structured form that may vary” (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 77). The
artifact for this research project was how to design an information security policy that is
effective in organizations in exceptional situations. The relevance of the problem is
important because the research objective of the study was to address the lack of
information about how to design information security policies intended to handle
exceptional situations in an organization and to improve this deficiency of knowledge.
The adopted research approach, therefore, followed the principle of “design theory
hypothesizing the effectiveness of the artifact(s) to achieve the goal(s)” (Baskerville et al.,
2011, p. 124).

57

Experiments and surveys are some of the common tools used in the evaluation
and validation process in research methodologies in the paradigm of behavioral science.
Researchers in the information systems industry have long been analyzing and
identifying theories by using these traditional methodologies. On the contrary, design
science attempts to appraise the usefulness and value of the design artifact in the field of
information systems research. This assessment cannot be accurately made unless the
effectiveness and quality of the system are well-defined. For instance, some of the
characteristics that might describe the quality of the system are usability, practicality,
comprehensiveness, stability, precision, dependability, and functionality (Hevner et al.,
2004). The aim of the assessment is to evaluate the effectiveness of the system and to
offer objectives for gradual enhancements to the artifact over time. The degree to which
information systems research meets the needs of organizations determines the degree of
relevance while the proper utilization of methodologies and foundation principles
establishes the bearing of relevance. Although other systems artifacts are also of
significance in the development of IS policies, March and Smith (1995) and Hevner et al.
(2004) argued that models, methods, and constructs are the most legitimate artifacts.
Constructs describe the theoretical terminology of a domain. Models express how
constructs are associated. Methods explain how to complete an assignment. Theories are
increasingly improved during the design-construction stage when concepts or
methodologies of an experimental nature are utilized.
The proposed end products of design science are generally twofold: (a) a
serviceable artifact that helps to resolve an explicit and demanding problem in a
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practicable manner within a particular framework, and; (b) significant contributions to
information security practitioners. The information security policy was developed with
input from subject- matter experts based on organizational strategies and processes and
business needs utilizing a prototype approach. Design science research involves a greater
number of elements than social-science research, such as communication with subjectmatter experts (SMEs), an understanding of the environment and conditions surrounding
the design, and construction and analysis of the system. A design science research
approach relies more heavily on theories in the decision-making process than a standard
systems research approach and on the capacity to gain broad assumptions from the
important act of developing the system.

3.7 Phase 4 – Evaluation

Design artifacts evaluated empirically through the use of experimentation help to
establish the artifact's characteristics (Hevner et al., 2004) and offer a foundation for
general conclusions. Walls et al. (1992) recommended an experimental design in which
the results of a group using an IT artifact are compared to the results of a group that is not
using an IT artifact. This study involved a pretest-posttest design that included a
treatment group and a control group. The participants were not assigned to these groups
by random assignment. Instead, a quasi-experiment, nonrandomized pretest-posttest
design was conducted using an experimental group and a control group. The
experimental group (Group A) underwent the treatment (X₁), while the control group
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(Group B) received no treatment at all. The control group also served as the
benchmarking point of comparison to evaluate the design effectiveness of an information
security policy for exceptional situations in an organization (Campbell & Stanley, 1963;
Creswell, 2008; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).

3.7.1

Sample population

The population of this study was full-time and part-time employees who work in a
single organization. There was a nonrandom sampling of participants and a nonrandom
assignment of participants from the organization’s administrative employee directory into
the two groups. Also, the group that received the treatment and the group that acted as the
control group were randomly selected (Creswell, 2008). According to Walls et al. (1992),
one practical design concept is to conduct an experiment in which the IT artifact is
provided to an experimental group while being withheld from a control group. The results
of each group can then be compared and contrasted (Walls et al., 1992).
Thirty participants in the quasi-experiment for this research study were nonrandomly assigned into a control group and an experimental group with 15 participants in
each group. According to Gay (1996), a minimum of 15 participants per group for quasiexperimental studies is sufficient and valid.
The experimental group (Group A) was provided with an information security
policy and hypothetical scenarios adapted from Siponen and Iivari (2006) and Siponen
and Vance (2010) upon which to base their answers. The treatment group (Group A) was

60

given a pretest and posttest treatment to determine if violating the information security
policy was attributable to policy design. The responses of the participants in the treatment
group (Group A) were compared to those of the participants in the control group (Group
B). Participants in Group B received an information security policy upon which to base
their answers. The participants in Group A were presented with a hypothetical scenario
describing an information security situation. They were asked to identify if the design
elements in the scenario are related to following or violating the information security
policy (treatment X). The participants in the control group (Group B) were presented with
the information security policy design artifact conceptualization and evaluation method
process, followed by questions that aimed at identifying the consequences of their actions
on information security in exceptional situations. There was no treatment given to Group
B. In summary, two observations were made for Group A and Group B, one prior to
treatment X₁ (pretest, O₁ / pretest, O₃) and one after treatment (posttest, O₂ / posttest, O₄).
Table 2. Two groups, A & B, pre-test, post-test.

Group
Treatment group = A
Control group = B

Pre-test
O₁
O₃

Treatment
(X₁)

Post-test
O₂
O₄

Treatment “X” represents the exposure of a group to an experimental variable or
treatment, the effect of which was measured. Post-test “O” represents “an observation or
measurement recorded on an instrument” (Creswell, 2008 p. 171).
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The results of the data collection were analyzed to predict the outcome of the
experiment in regard to how information security policy design elements can increase the
effectiveness of an information security policy in exceptional situations.

3.7.2

Study instrument

A survey was developed and tested for reliability and validity and was used for
the data collection. As a validated instrument, a survey is useful in establishing accurate
associations between any variables used in the experiment (Creswell, 2008). A survey is
a term that includes all techniques of data collections in which an individual is asked to
respond to questions in a particular order. Surveys are useful instruments for collecting
data while providing anonymity to the respondent, promoting responses that are more
accurate and trustworthy (Creswell, 2008).
The survey was divided into two parts. The first part focused on obtaining
demographic information about the respondent and the organization. The following
demographic information was collected: gender, age, years of experience, years with the
organization, educational level, and security certifications.
The second part was composed of questions designed to assess the various
aspects of information security policy design. An expert panel with ten participants who
had information security certification, such as CISM, CISSP and CISA (Hevner &
Chatterjee, 2010), verified the validity of the survey instrument and established if the
participants of the survey were likely to have trouble responding to any of its components
(Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010; Stewart, Shamdasan, & Rook, 2007). During instrument
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survey development, questionnaire questions that may have appeared to be unclear,
intrusive or confusing to the potential study participants were eliminated using a
willingness-to-answer scale (Knapp, Marshall, Rainer, & Ford, 2006). An item-toconstruct scale was also used to help eliminate double-barreled questions and to address
content validity (Hinkin, 1998). The researcher employed the procedure for developing a
measurement instrument provided by Hinkin (1998). The instrument is illustrated in
appendix B. A five-point Likert-type scale was used. Scalar questions enable a
respondent to give an opinion as an answer. Numeric scales grant the ability to give a
positive or negative response to a statement (Dawes, 2008). The scale's granularity may
vary, in general. For example, a coarse scale may range from one to three while a fine
scale may range from one to ten. According to DeVellis, 2011, scales ranging between
one to five or seven are generally adequate to give respondents sufficient differentiation.
Scales that are odd-numbered give respondents the option to remain “neutral,” while
scales that are even-numbered are given to respondents if a “neutral” response will
detract from the study's validity (Dillman, Smyth & Christian, 2009). Scalar questions
frequently employ Likert scales (Dix, Finlay, Abowd & Beale, 2004; Preece, Rogers &
Sharp, 2007). The survey instrument was used to answer questions in regard to the
clarity, comprehensiveness, flexibility and usability of the design of an information
security policy, as illustrated in appendix B.
The hypothetical scenarios and questions were adopted from seminal papers of
Siponen & Iivari, 2006 and Siponen & Vance, 2010 and were based on the hypotheses
H1, H2 and H3 of the prima-facie, utilitarian and universalizability design theories,

63

respectively. The survey used a Likert scale with a five-point range. According to Dawes,
2008, the five-point Likert format is the most prevalent to ensure scale validity and
reliability. The number 1 represented "strongly disagree," and the number 5 represented
"strongly agree," granting every question a distinctive negative and positive descriptor.
Table 3. Likert scale with a five-point range (reverse order descriptor).

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

5

4

3

2

Strongly
Disagree
1

For every question, the number 1 signified the negative descriptor with the lowest value,
the number 5 signified the positive descriptor with the highest value, and the number 3
signified a neutral value. If a respondent choose a low value, it signified that the
individual felt a more powerful associative connection with the statement. If a respondent
choose a high value, it signified that the individual felt a weak associative connection
with the statement. Therefore, the stronger the respondent’s associative connection, the
more negative the individual’s outlook, and the weaker the respondent’s associative
connection, the more positive the individual’s outlook. The data were gathered using a
questionnaire and were quantitative in nature, using the scale development theory
proposed by DeVellis (2011).

3.7.3

Data Analysis

For the purposes of this research study, statistical regression analysis techniques
were used to analyze the data to determine the dependability, validity and internal
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stability of the instrument. Inferential statistics and factorial analysis strategies were
employed, as suggested by Creswell (2008), which included an overall review of all
information, data preparation, data reduction, organization and categorization. Inferential
statistics used the general linear model (GLM) and included a repeated measure ANOVA
(Nelder & Wedderburn, 1972).
This study employed a posttest and pretest non-equivalent control group design of
the quasi-experimental research design. An inferential statistics quasi-experimental
research approach was used because the study was conducted in only one organization. A
posttest and pretest non-equivalent control group of quasi-experimental design was used.
The experimental and control groups were not equated by randomization in the
organization.
The data analysis employed repeated measures of ANOVA to determine if
voluntariness in following the information security policy resulted in different
consequences of actions taken by employees. If different consequences of actions taken
by employees were detected, the analysis also ascertained the impact on overall design
effectiveness.

3.7.4

Analysis Procedures

The following approach was used to prepare the data before analysis. The first
step included examining and validating the results. During data analysis, data were
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entered into Microsoft Excel and exported to SPSS for further analysis. Any missing data
were added using the missing data function in SPSS.
According to Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002), quasi-experimental designs
are effective for obtaining information on the relationships between cause and effect.
However, this approach is not devoid of risks in regard to its validity. Shadish et al. (2002)
proposed three principles to help overcome these threats when using a quasi-experimental
design:
1.

Identification and evaluation of plausible threats to internal validity.

2.

Control by design. Multiple control groups, multiple baselines, and

statistical control as a last resort.
3.

Coherent pattern matching. This principle involves making a complex

prediction about a particular causal hypothesis that would leave few viable alternative
explanations. The logic behind this principle is that the more complex the prediction, the
less likely that a given alternative could generate the same results (Terrell, 2012).
Identification and evaluation of plausible threats to internal validity were conducted
during the reliability and validity testing of the survey instrument and quasi-experimental
design phase.
Regression analysis was performed to examine how well the independent
variables explained the dependent variable (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003).
Regression models can be used to predict values on information security consequences
(dependent variable) based on information from the (independent) variables security
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expected benefits; happiness brought about by security actions; universalizability by
security actions; and voluntariness.

Overall Model Fit (F-Test): Was employed to ascertain if it is more beneficial to use the
regression model rather than only the mean of the dependent variable. Additionally,
calculations of the overall sample level of mean scores for all Likert-scaled items were
reported.

3.7.5

Methods of Analysis

Descriptive statistics, and repeated measures ANOVA were used as tools to test
hypotheses. The three hypotheses in this study were tested using the t-test to determine
the significant difference between the means scores of the pretest and posttest treatments
of the participants in order to find out if the results were statistically significant at
Cronbach’s α 0.05 levels. The focus of the hypotheses was the difference between
variables of interest. Hypotheses H1 through H3 were tested to determine the degree of
significance and, specifically, whether this difference was greater than would be expected
by chance. Given that hypotheses H1 through H3 compare two variables, inferential
statistical methods were also applied (Creswell 2008). The hypothesis H1 through H3
were then analyzed using t-test. The t-test, t-value and standard error of the difference
were used to assess whether the means of the two groups (A & B) were statistically
different from each other (Terrell, 2012). A pretest was used in this study because the
control group and treatment group needed to be examined for equality, as group selection
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was not random and groups may have had preexisting differences (Campbell & Stanley,
1963). Results from the t-test were examined for significant and insignificant differences
between the two groups on the pretest. In order to test the three hypothesis, H1, H2 and
H3, an Cronbach’s α level of p <0.05 were used.
ANCOVA (analysis of covariance) is an extension of ANOVA and was used to
examine whether group means (categorical independent variable) differed on the
information security consequence (ISC) dependent variable after statistical control for
another continuous variables (covariate). The analysis was accomplished through the
selection of general linear model (GLM) procedures and repeated measures ANOVA
(Nelder & Wedderburn, 1972).
The results of the survey from the pre-test and post-test groups were analyzed
using the SPSS-computer-statistical analysis program. Both descriptive and inferential
statistical analysis techniques were used to identify any relationships and group
differences in scores on the survey items and Likert scale scores. In order to determine if
a linear relationship existed between dependent variables for each group, a scatterplot
was generated to confirm linearity assumptions. A Pearson’s correlation was conducted
to examine multicollinearity among the dependent variables (Cohen, Cohen, West &
Aiken, 2003; Harrell, 2001; Myers, 1990). According to Cohen et al., statistics aid
researchers in excluding the significant risk that the soundness of the results of an
experiment could be attributable to probability instead of actual dissimilarities in the test
group. Additional statistics were run to assess normality and univariate outliers, in which
histograms and boxplots were examined to ensure that any that noted dissimilarities were
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not the result of a recording error. The confidence level setup for the analysis was set to
0.5 to decrease the chances of making a type I error. Univariate analyses of variance for
each dependent variable were conducted as follow-up tests, using the Bonferroni method
for controlling Type I error rates for multiple comparisons and were tested at a
significance level of 0.5.

3.7.6

Internal and External Validity

Internal validity refers to the degree to which the independent variables may
impact the differences detected in the dependent variables. Another possible threat to
internal validity is the extraneous variables. If these variables are not controlled, their
results may mistakenly appear to be attributable to the effects of the experiment itself.
External validity indicates how significantly the scope of a study’s findings may
accurately or inaccurately affect the generalizability (applicability) of those findings
outside of the sample. Threats to external validity are helpful in determining how errors
may be made in the generalizing of the findings of a study.
Campbell and Stanley’s (1963) seminal paper served as the designated basis for
the description of possible threats to the internal and external accuracy of the findings of
this study, based on its research design. The following table provides a definition of each
threat present and its manner of being controlled for internal validity.
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Table 4. Threats to Internal Validity (Campbell & Stanley, 1963)
Threats to Internal Validity

History

Maturation

Testing

Instrumentation

Events, other than the
experimental treatments, influence
results.
During the study, psychological
changes occur within participants
Exposure to a pretest or
intervening assessment influences
performance on a posttest.
Testing instruments or conditions
are inconsistent; or pretest and
posttest are not equivalent,
creating an illusory change in
performance.

Statistical
Regression

Scores of participants that are very
high or very low tend to regress
towards the mean during retesting.

Selection

Systematic differences exist in
participants’ characteristics
between treatment groups.

Experimental
Mortality

Participant attrition may bias the
results.

Diffusion of
Treatments

Implementation of one condition
influences participants in another
condition.

Interaction
effect of
selection biases
and treatment
Reactive
experimental
arrangements

Sample not representative of the
population i.e. not selected
randomly
Participants’ knowledge of
participating in experiment may
affect their responses

Presence
Yes / No

Control of Threat
Keep a list of
dropouts in
both treatment and
control groups
Control variables,
nonrandom sampling
Will use ANCOVA
to adjust pretest
scores
Examination of data
sources over study
period

Three or more
observation points,
nonrandom sampling
Evaluation of
sampling criteria
Comparisons
between retained
and lost participants
Participants in the
control group will
receive treatment at
a different date
Non-random
assignment will be
used
Will not control
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The following table provides a definition of each threat present and its manner of being
controlled for external validity.
Table 5. Threats to External Validity (Campbell & Stanley, 1963)

Threats to External Validity

Interaction of
testing and
treatment

The interaction of testing with
treatment

Interaction of
selection and
treatment

The interaction of treatments with
treatment

Reactive
arrangements

Tests of significance for this
design

Multipletreatment
interference

Multiple treatments are given to
the same participants

3.7.7

Presence
Yes / No

Control of Threat
A pretest is not used
on the experimental
group.

The population is
described in the
research study. A
statistical technique
such as ANCOVA is
used, in conjunction
with quasiexperimental design.
No lab setting is
used. A control
group and an
experimental group
are used.
No multiple
treatments are given.

Results

Results from the data analysis and interpretation are described in Chapter Four.
Bivariate and multivariate analyses were performed on the data.
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3.8 Phase 5 – Conclusion.

A design-science research methodology was applied in order to achieve the
research study objective of designing an information security policy that is effective in
exceptional situations. As the final process of the research study, this phase disclosed the
results and contributions of the experiment, including the artifact design and all
additional knowledge regarding the design process, such as construction and evaluation.
The output of this phase was an acceptable research contribution. The conclusion phase
indicated termination of the design project. The design-science research results were
published and communicated to technical and management audiences (Hevner et al.,
2004).

3.9 Miscellaneous

3.9.1

Limitations

This study was limited to full-time and part-time employees who worked in the
following departments of a single organization: information systems and technology;
human resources; finance; legal; and corporate communications. The priorities of the
study were to determine if and why employees violated or complied with an information
security policy in exceptional situations based on the application principles—net benefits,
overall adherence to security objectives, and universality of actions— of the prima-facie,
utilitarian and universalizability design theories. In terms of generalizability, the study
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was limited to the adult population with the general exclusion of adults who were at or
beyond retirement age. However, the study sample was represented a diverse range of
ages in the adult population. All of the participants in the study were chosen on a
volunteer basis and retained the right to withdraw at any point in time. Therefore, the
participants who completed the study may not accurately represent the adult population
(Creswell, 2008).
The participants in this experiment were asked to engage in an analysis-of-attitude
survey using independent and dependent variables that were intended to gauge the
participant’s actions instead of the participant’s opinions. Although it was anonymous,
this study may have been limited by the participant’s subjectivity or deceptive responses.
In addition, the study was not intended to use a self-directed learning readiness scale or to
determine the qualities or elements that promoted the participant’s fulfillment in life.
Rather, it determined how significant or valuable the participants considered certain
assets and attributes in contributing to their happiness or satisfaction in life.
The study consisted of pre-test and post-test experimental exercises. However,
because quantitative research is generally inflexible and employs brief dialog sessions, it
is susceptible to inaccuracies if the study is not conducted accurately. In addition, the
participant’s moral principles or unwillingness to comply can interfere with the
successful execution of the experiment. Finally, if the sampling and weighting of a
quantitative experiment are mishandled, the accuracy and findings of the study may be
jeopardized.
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There is the possibility of bias in the data generated by the study because it was
conducted at the researcher’s place of employment and because participants may not
respond accurately when they are aware that they are participating in an experiment. The
participants may also have considered some of the terminology in the study to be
ambiguous or obscure in meaning, making it difficult for them to accurately assess their
responses to certain questions.
Additionally, even though employees may believe that an information security
policy is important; their actions are not always reconciled with this belief. Therefore, it
is possible that a participant may not behave as indicated in a response if he or she is
faced with that situation in the actual workplace.

3.9.2

Delimitations

The effectiveness of design theories other than the prima-facie, utilitarian and
universalizability design theories are beyond the scope of this study. Additionally, this
study did not intended to examine employee compliance with an information security
policy under normal or stable circumstances or determine the frequency with which
employees or organizations encounter exceptional situations (Siponen, & Vance,2010;
Zafar, & Clark, 2009).
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Chapter 4

Results of repeated measures ANOVA Analysis

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapters presented, outlined and discussed the research
methodology, quasi experiment, data gathering techniques and the methods used to show
and analyze the gathered data. This chapter details the results of those phases.

4.2 Data Preparation

Prior to analysis, the data were prepared to assure they would accurately execute
within the SPSS software. First, the results gathered from the questionnaires were
examined and validated. Second, the data were entered from the questionnaires into a
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and exported to an SPSS tool. The pretest and posttest data
collected from group A and group B were coded and entered into SPSS version 23.0 for
descriptive statistical analyses and interpretation. Participant responses to statements
based on a Likert scale were considered as ordinal variables and assigned codes. Code 1
represented “strongly disagree” while code 5 represented “strongly agree.” Third, any
missing data were added using the missing data function in the SPSS tool. This format
was deemed closest to the data cleaning input in the SPSS tool. The data collected from
the pre-intervention test and the post-intervention test were analyzed by descriptive
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statistics. The results on the given questions in both the pretest and the posttest were
analyzed.
.
4.3 Demographic Findings

Of the 32 participants' total responses utilized within this quasi-experimental
study, 15 points of demographic data were collected. Participants were initially asked to
identify their gender. Of the participants, 65.6% identified as male and 34.4% identified
as female. Table 6 below presents the gender distribution of the questionnaire
participants.
Table 6. Gender Distribution

Gender

Frequency

Percentage of
Respondents

Male
Female

21
11

65.6
34.4

Next, participants were asked to identify their age group. None of the participants
were in the 18-30 age group; 15.6% of participants identified themselves as members of
the 30-39 age group; 34.4% of participants identified themselves as members of the 4049 age group; and 50% of participants identified themselves as members of the 50-65 age
group. Table 7 shows the age distribution of the questionnaire participants.
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Table 7. Age Distribution

Age

Frequency

Percentage of
Respondents

18-29
30-39
40-49
50-65

0
5
11
16

0.0
15.6
34.4
50.0

Participants were also asked to describe their highest completed level of
education. Of the participants, 9.4% responded that they had completed high school;
18.8% responded that they had completed an Associate’s degree; 53.1% responded with
completion of a Bachelor’s degree; 18.8% responded with completion of a Master’s
degree; and none of the participants responded that they had earned a Doctorate degree.
Table 8 presents the education level distribution of the questionnaire participants.

Table 8. Education Level Distribution

Age

Frequency

Percentage of
Respondents

High School
AA/AS
BA/BS
MA/MS
PhD

3
6
17
16
0

9.4
18.8
53.1
18.8
0
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Participants were also asked to describe their highest completed level of
education. Of the participants, 9.4% responded that they had completed high school;
18.8% responded that they had completed an Associate’s degree; 53.1% responded with
completion of a Bachelor’s degree; 18.8% responded with completion of a Master’s
degree; and none of the participants responded that they had earned a Doctorate degree.
Table 9 presents the security certification level distribution of the questionnaire
participants.

Table 9. Security Certification Distribution

Age

Frequency

Percentage of
Respondents

CISSP
CISM
CISA
OTHER
NONE

0
0
2
5
25

0
0
6.3
15.6
78.1

4.4 Findings

The effectiveness of design theories other than the prima-facie, utilitarian and
universalizability design theories are beyond the scope of this study. Cronbach’s α was
calculated at 0.719, suggesting an acceptable reliability coefficient among the items

78

tested. The design model demonstrated internal consistency through Cronbach’s α. The
table 10 represents the Cronbach’s α reliability coefficient.
Table 10. Cronbach’s alpha

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha Based on
Cronbach's

Standardized

Alpha

Items
.719

N of Items
.656

18

The pre-test and post-test activity included concurrent administration of identical
questionnaires to both Group A (treatment) and Group B (control group - no treatment).
The goal of the pre-test questionnaire was to examine the participants' first reactions to
the concepts of voluntariness; security-expected benefits; happiness brought about by
security actions; universalizability by security actions; and attitudes. The results then
served as a foundation upon which to base comparisons for the intervention's outcome
and effects. The purpose of the post-test questionnaire was to examine the direct
consequences of the intervention on participants’ voluntariness; security expected
benefits; happiness brought about by security actions; universalizability by security
actions; and attitudes. The contents of the pretest and posttest questionnaires were
identical. A paired-samples t-test was used to compare the mean scores of the pretest
treatment group A and posttest control group B. The table 11 shows results at .000 Sig.
(2-tailed) and the significant level is less than .05.
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Table 11. Paired Samples Test
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences

Std.
Deviation

Mean
Pair 1

Group Participant

-7.000

Std.
Error
Mean

4.711

.833

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
-8.698

Upper
-5.302

t

Sig. (2tailed)

df

-8.405

31

The results show that at .000 Sig. (2-tailed), the significant level is less than .05,
and the difference is significant.

For H1, a comparison of the mean of the six prima-facie questions of each
treatment was completed. Using a paired t-test, the data support H1 with a p value <=
0.000. The results from hypothesis H1 show that when participants used the design
artifact treatment, they were able to answer all six questions pertaining to the prima-facie
in contrast to those who did not receive the treatment.
Table 12. H1 Prima Facie

One-Sample Test
Test Value = 0

t
H1

20.003

Sig. (2tailed)

df
31

.000

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference

Mean
Difference

Lower

Upper

13.37500

12.0113

14.7387

For H2, a comparison of the mean of the six utilitarian questions of each
treatment was completed. Using a paired t-test, the data support H2 with a p value <=

.000
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0.000. The results from hypothesis H2 show that when participants used the design
artifact treatment, they were able to answer all six questions pertaining to utilitarian
theory hypotheses in contrast to those who did not receive the treatment.

Table 13. H2 Utilitarian

One-Sample Test
Test Value = 0

t
H2

Sig. (2tailed)

df

20.003

31

.000

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference

Mean
Difference

Lower

Upper

13.37500

12.0113

14.7387

For H3, a comparison of the mean of the six universalizability questions of each
treatment was completed. Using a paired t-test, the data support H3 with a p value <=
0.000. The results from hypothesis H3 show that when participants used the design
artifact treatment, they were able to answer all six questions pertaining to the
universalizability theory in contrast to those who did not receive the treatment.

Table 14. H3 Universalizability

One-Sample Test
Test Value = 0

t
H3

20.003

Sig. (2tailed)

df
31

.000

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference

Mean
Difference

Lower

Upper

13.37500

12.0113

14.7387
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4.5 Summary

The effectiveness of design theories other than the prima-facie, utilitarian and
universalizability design theories are beyond the scope of this study.

Table 15. Hypotheses Results

Hypotheses

H1: If the employees’ voluntarism and the expected benefits of
noncompliance increase, then an organization will experience fewer
consequences in response to employee noncompliance in exceptional
situations.

Results

Supported

H2: If the employees' voluntarism and happiness of noncompliance increase,
then an organization will experience fewer consequences in response to
employee noncompliance in exceptional situations.

Supported

H3: If the employees' voluntarism and universalizability of noncompliance
increase, then an organization will experience fewer consequences in
response to employee noncompliance in exceptional situations.

Supported

Results show that all three hypotheses - H1, H2, and H3 - are supported.
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Chapter 5

Conclusion

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the conclusion of the research study and includes a
summary of the findings. It further outlines recommendations for future research studies.
Limitations in this research study have been presented in a separate section.

5.2 Findings - Contributions

The contribution of this study is to use the design science research method and to
provide a design science artifact to practitioners and scholars to design effective
information security policies in exceptional situations in emergent organizations.
The scope of the methodologies, settings and goals of IS information security
research is continually increasing. To increase its hypothetical, scholarly and scientific
base, IS information security research also needs to expand to include participation and
research developments from other fields of study. The difficulty faced by researchers is
that attaining significant contributions from other disciplines is a complicated process.
Researchers must be aware of changes that are occurring in all aspects of the IS
information security research field and how these changes may affect the interaction
between relevant disciplines.
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Based on the analysis of fit the model for designing an effective information
security policy for exceptional situations in an organization was determine to be a success
model.
It was discovered in the posttest that there was an increase in the scores of the
employees’ voluntarism across the three design theories. This could be attributed to the
use of the three design theories to develop an effective information security policy. These
findings can be significant to practitioners who seek to develop an effective information
security policy in exceptional situations. Indeed, the results of this study implied that the
questionnaire, and the prima-facie, utilitarian and universalizability design theories used
by the researcher were effective tools for designing an effective information security
policy in exceptional situations in an organization. This finding agrees with the works of
Siponen and Iivari (2006) and confirmed the recommendation of the use of the primafacie, utilitarian and universalizability design theories in designing effective information
security policies. Although all information security policies must contain some nonnormative elements, the following analogy helps to clarify how a policy based primarily
on normative standards can aid employees in making choices that are the most
advantageous to an organization, particularly when those choices need to be made swiftly
and decisively. Findings in the study show employees need a degree of voluntarism to
violate information security policies for the greatest benefit of the organization in
exceptional situations.
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These findings also indicate that designing an information security policy with the
three elements of a kernel theory basis; application principles from that kernel theory
specifying how employees should manage exceptional situations; and hypotheses that can
be tested can assist in advancing the continued effectiveness of information security
policies that may arise in an exceptional situation (Siponen & Iivari, 2006).
In conclusion it could be strongly affirmed that the use of application and
effectiveness of design science approach to information security of the prima-facie,
utilitarian and universalizability design theories are key when developing an effective
information security policy for exceptional situations in an organization. The method to
apply these three design principles and develop security policy provided rigorous testing
and empirical support to design theories for information security policy proposed by
Siponen and Iivari (2006).

5.3 Implications

The information security policy design approach contributes to the IS knowledge
base by shrinking the existing research gap in the design of information security policies
in exceptional situations in emergent organizations. This approach provides a
methodology that incorporates kernel-theory requirements and constraints into the
analysis and design phases and considers meta-policies as functional security
requirements. This approach also supplies practitioners with a method that can be used to
develop and design an information security policy in exceptional situations in emergent
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organizations. Organizations and practitioners would benefit from designing effective
information security policies. The design instantiation artifact can help practitioners to
design effective information security policies in exceptional situations in emergent
organizations to improve the general state of information security. Hevner et al. (2004)
suggest the use of a sequential research process that involves determining a pertinent
business problem that the design of an IT artifact can resolve and evaluating the artifact
with the proper methodologies so that it can be added to the IS knowledge base.

5.4 Limitations

The main limitations were that the study focus only on normative theories and
only 32 participants from one organization participate in testing. The primary barrier in
this research study was the difficulty in designing an information security policy that
analyzed or accounted for the motivations that caused employees to comply with or
violate the terms of the policy in exceptional situations. In order to determine if an
information security policy design process and the application principles that focus on
clarity, comprehensiveness, flexibility and usability regarding guidelines for handling
exceptional situations were effective, a design science research approach needed to be
followed (Hevner, 2004). Without any guidelines to follow when exceptional situations
arise, an employee is liable to take actions that compromise the CIA of an organization’s
data or cause the organization to miss out on lucrative business prospects (Siponen &
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Iivari, 2006). The issue of employee noncompliance with an information security policy
is of fundamental importance to organizations and their information security experts.

5.5 Recommendations for future research

In designing future studies, the following suggestions may be considered.
a. Future research should explore of other theories for design.
b. Future research should study a much larger population size. Increasing the
sample size would enhance the validity of the findings.
c.

Future research should examine the economics of employees’ deliberate
violations of information security policies in exceptional situations in emergent
organizations.

The proposed future research studies will encourage further research that will
offer valuable insights to practitioners and scholars in the area of designing
effective information security policies in emergent organizations.

5.6 Conclusion

This study built upon Siponen & Iivari (2006) and Hevner, March, Park and Ram
(2004) to develop a model for designing an effective information security policy for
exceptional situations in an organization. The results significantly increase the
understanding of the importance of designing an effective information security policy in
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exceptional situations and provide empirical direction to practitioners on how to achieve
this goal.
Many organizations fail to develop and administer an information security policy
that analyzes or accounts for the motivations that cause employees to comply with or
violate the terms of the policy in exceptional situations. As a result, employees may be
left with a lack of direction or independence in taking the actions that are the most
beneficial for an organization. This, in turn, can lead employees to make choices that
endanger an organization’s information assets. Employees may be faced with the conflict
of having to violate the terms of an information security policy in order to satisfy a
client’s unanticipated request in a timely manner. Even if violating the policy provides
advantages for the organization that outweigh those of adhering to it, an employee may
decide that it is best to strictly comply with the information security policy if he or she is
provided with no guidance or flexibility in determining how to handle exceptional
situations. Therefore, it is in the best interests of an organization to develop and
implement an information security policy that provides employees with guidelines on
how to deal with exceptional situations and grants them a degree of voluntariness in
adhering to those guidelines, particularly in cases where the terms of the policy contradict
the organization’s business goals and objectives.
Information security policies need to be designed to provide clarity, flexibility and
usability to employees whether they violate the policy, intend to comply with it or do
comply with it during exceptional situations that address the impact of the perceived
benefits of non-compliance. The research study demonstrated how a design science
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research approach can be useful not only for the design of IS information security
policies but also for the design of a research instrument to study exceptional situations in
the implementation of IS information security policies. This study uses a design science
research (Hevner et al., 2004) approach that readily lends itself to the need for
information security research that equally supports the critical elements of rigor and
relevance. The caution and detail used in the methodologies and tools of design science
research aid researchers in developing a more distinct and refined approach to the
research problem and solution space prior to beginning substantive studies.
In order to develop additional processes and procedures for creating research
instruments that aid in the design of information security policies in exceptional
situations, it is necessary to evaluate, compare and contrast various research techniques.
Information gleaned from the design science research field in IS is valuable in
ascertaining the stringent development of research tools that provide highly effective
results for determining research methods and practices to use in the design of information
security policies in exceptional situations.
The results of this study suggest that design science research principles and
kernel theory techniques provide clarity, comprehensiveness, ease of use and flexibility to
influence practitioners when designing and implementing information security policies in
exceptional situations in emergent organizations. Therefore an important factor to take
into account is that the design, development and implementation of information security
policies that allow deliberate violations of their terms by employees in emergent
organizations decreases the information security consequences in exceptional situations.
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Appendix A
Hypothetical Scenario:
“Jack works in a software house, which has strict security rules laid down by a senior
security specialist, who is regarded as the authority figure in security matters. The
security policy includes a rule that states that passwords are personal and that one’s
password cannot be given to anybody else. Any exception must be approved by the
senior security specialist. During the summer, while the senior security specialist and
most of the developers are on their holidays, Jack and a few of his co-workers receive
additional requirements for feature changes from an important customer. Jack needs to
make changes to the software quickly in order to keep to the deadline. To do this, Jack
needs to access some files to which he currently does not have access (access can be
granted by a developer, who is on his holiday at that time, and the security specialist or
his subordinates). Jack cannot reach the senior security specialist at that time, and the
developer who has control over the files is also on holiday. He is available, but cannot
remember his password any more (he forgot it while on holiday). Jack contacts Matt, who
is a subordinate of the senior security specialist, but Matt wonders if he dares to violate
the IS security policy of the organization. If Matt does not grant access to Jack, the result
is that the software company will miss the deadline, which further results in the software
company having to compensate the client financially. This may further damage the
reputation of the software company, which in turn may reduce future contracts, and lead
to other consequences.”
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Appendix B
Survey Questionnaire:
Please read each statement; then indicate the degree to which you agree/disagree with the
statement as it relates to the hypothetical scenario by selecting the appropriate answer.

Gender:
Male: ___ Female: ___
Age:
18 – 29 ____ 30 – 39 ____ 40 – 49 ____ 50 – 65 ____
Educational Level:
High School ____ AA/AS ____ BA/BS ____ MA/MS ____ Doctorate ____
Security Certification:
CISSP ____ CISM ____ CISA ____ Other ____
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly disagree

1. If I was Matt I would dare to violate the information
security policy in the described hypothetical scenario.

1

2

3

4

5

2. If I were absolutely sure that the benefits of violating
the IS security policy and guidelines in the example
situation would exceed the costs, I would be ready to
violate the policy and guidelines.

1

2

3

4

5

3. It is okay to violate the company information security
policy if no damage is done to the company.

1

2

3

4

5
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4. It is acceptable to violate a company information
security policy to get a job done.

1

2

3

4

5

5. If you were the president of the organization, would you
allow violation of the IS security policy by any
trustworthy member of the project group in order to
speed up software development?

1

2

3

4

5

6. It would cause problems in my life if I jeopardized my
future job promotion prospects for taking the actions
that Jack did in the hypothetical scenario.

1

2

3

4

5

7. It would cause problems in your life if you were formally
sanctioned for taking the actions that Jack did in the
hypothetical scenario.

1

2

3

4

5

8. I feel that general adherence to my company’s
information
security
policy
compensates
for
occasionally violating its terms.

1

2

3

4

5

9. I feel my hard work in the company compensates for
occasionally violating an information security policy.

1

2

3

4

5

10. It is okay to violate the company information security
policy when you are in a hurry.

1

2

3

4

5

11. I would be unhappy if others knew that I had violated a
company’s information security policy.

1

2

3

4

5

12. It would cause me problems if I felt unhappy that
managers knew that I had violated the company
information security policy.

1

2

3

4

5

13. I would be unhappy if team members knew that I had
violated a company’s information security policy.

1

2

3

4

5

14. It is acceptable to violate the company information
security policy if circumstances seem to offer you little
other choice.

1

2

3

4

5

15. It is okay to violate the company information security
policy if no harm is done to me or to another colleague.

1

2

3

4

5
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16. If I knew that violation of IS security policy and
guidelines in the example situation represented just
and honest action, I would be ready to violate the policy
and guidelines.

1

2

3

4

5

17. If the proposed action does not comply with Company
policy, but lead to business success, would you violate
the IS security policy?

1

2

3

4

5

18. It is not as wrong to violate a company information
security policy that is not reasonable.

1

2

3

4

5

104

Appendix C
The following table depicts the how each question is linked to hypotheses and research
model.

Question Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Hypotheses
H1
H1
H1
H1
H1
H1
H2
H2
H2
H2
H2
H2
H3
H3
H3
H3
H3
H3

Design Theory

Prima-Facie

Utilitarian

Universalizability

